This paper provides empirical evidence for the Keynesian demand-driven propagation: initial rounds of job losses lead to additional rounds of job losses. The paper shows that U.S. counties with higher pre-existing exposure to tradable industries experienced larger job losses in non-tradable sectors during the Great Recession. This was arguably because laid-off tradable workers cut their consumption, which hurts local non-tradable firms. The finding is not driven by exposure to the construction sector, by the collapse in house prices, or by credit supply problems. In addition, the spillover is stronger when the focus is on the job losses of more income-elastic non-tradable sectors.
INTRODUCTION
Since Keynes (1936) , economists and policy makers have been concerned about downward demand spirals in recessions-the idea that initial job losses can lead to additional cuts in consumption, and as a consequence, further job losses. Since the start of the Great Recession, the concern has been raised again by many economists. Paul Krugman, for example, at the height of the economic crisis, argued that "rising unemployment will lead to further cuts in consumer spending. Weak consumer spending will lead to cutbacks in business investment plans. And the weakening economy will lead to more job cuts, provoking a further cycle of contraction…To pull us out of this downward spiral, the federal government will have to provide economic stimulus in the form of higher spending and greater aid to those in distress" (New York Times, November 14, 2008) .
This paper provides empirical evidence to support the demand-driven propagation channel. The evidence has significant policy implications, both in the U.S. and around the world. Keynesian As a consequence, austerity has become the reality in many parts of the world. If such a downward demand spiral can be proven to exist, advocates for fiscal and other demand stimulating policies may have a stronger argument to defend these them.
My identification strategy is as follows: I exploit the pre-existing variation in the exposure to tradable sectors across U.S. counties. I find that counties with higher pre-existing exposure to tradable industries experience stronger job losses in non-tradable sectors during the Great Recession. Across counties, a 1% increase in pre-existing tradable exposure is associated with a 0.49% decrease in non-tradable employment between 2007 and 2010. This could arguably be caused by laid-off tradable workers cutting their consumption, consequently hurting local nontradable firms. There has been little empirical evidence so far to support the demand propagation channel. This is partly because it is very difficult to separate different rounds of job losses in the data. In other words, we are not certain if one's job loss causes others' job losses, or the other way around. As can be seen in Figure 1 .1, initial declines in tradable employment could consequently cause declines in tradable and non-tradable employment. In turn, declines in non-tradable employment could lead to further declines in non-tradable and tradable employment. For example, laid-off automobile workers could postpone purchasing new TV sets, and cut back their restaurant meals.
If this were the case, restaurant workers would then lose their jobs and would no longer be able to afford new cars, which would affect the jobs of automobile workers. The impacts of unemployment are intertwined, occur at the same time, and are difficult to separate.
To overcome this difficulty, I focus on only one direction of propagation: the impacts of tradable job losses on non-tradable job losses (the large red arrow in Figure 1 .1). The innovation of my identification strategy is that to a county, tradable job losses are exogenous, that is, they function as shocks to the county. This is the case because demand for tradable goods comes largely from the rest of the U.S. Since there are more than 3000 counties in the U.S., by and large, a county's own demand has little effect on the county's tradable production.
A relevant measure for tradable job losses is the job losses as a fraction of the population. It captures the intensity of the shocks that tradable job losses inflict on local communities. The higher the number of laid-off tradable workers relative to the local population, the more severe 4 the shock should be. Alternatively, one could use counties' tradable exposure (measured by precrisis tradable employment as a fraction of population) as a good proxy for tradable job losses.
Let's take Elkhart County-Indiana, as an example. Elkhart is best known for producing recreation vehicles (RV). It has been referred to as the "RV Capital of the World". Before the recession, one in every four jobs in Elkhart was tied to the service or manufacturing of RV and component parts. The county suffered badly when the recession hit, and demand for recreational vehicles came to a halt. The county's unemployment rate reached 18.8% in April 2009 --the highest in the nation at the time. The job losses in the RV industry came as a shock to the county; they were driven by the county's pre-existing exposure to the RV industry. I find that in counties that were more exposed to tradable industries like Elkhart, the non-tradable sectors (specifically, retail and restaurants) also suffered significant job losses. This is basic evidence for the demand propagation channel.
I pay particular attention to competing channels. First, I argue that the relationship is not driven by county-specific supply factors. It is also not driven by construction job losses or a collapse in house prices, two prominent factors in the Great Recession. Additionally, the relationship is not driven by the credit channel, i.e., the possibility that the negative spillover from tradable job losses to non-tradable job losses is due to credit supply issues. For example, underwater tradable firms may default to local banks, who would then be unable to provide credit to the non-tradable firms. However, I show econometrically that this is not the case.
In addition, I find that negative spillovers from tradable job losses are stronger and more statistically significant for more income-elastic non-tradable sectors than for less income-elastic ones. This finding strengthens the argument for demand-driven spillovers. Finally, I focus on the exposure to hardest hit tradable industries, such as automobiles, oil and gas. The results are stronger than the baseline results: areas with higher exposure to these industries witness larger job losses in non-tradable sectors.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a literature review; section 3 presents the identification strategy in details; section 4 discusses the data; section 5 reports the main results; section 6 discusses four alternative hypotheses and argues that they are not driving the results; section 7 presents two extensions; section 8 discusses further insights, where I argue that Mian and Sufi (2014)'s core result is downward biased; finally, section 9 concludes. 6 This paper is also related to a large, and hotly debated, literature on fiscal multipliers. Estimated fiscal multipliers vary widely (see Ramney, 2011 for a literature review). Many have found multipliers that are smaller than one, and potentially close to zero, while others have found substantially larger multipliers. For the U.S., Barro and Redlick (2011) find that the multiplier for temporary defense spending is 0.4-0.5 contemporaneously and 0.6-0.7 over two years.
Ramney (2011) uses a narrative approach to construct U.S. government spending news variables, and obtains the multipliers in the range from 0.6 to 1.2. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) exploit regional variations in military buildups to estimate the multiplier of military procurement in the range of 1.4-1.9. In Serrato and Wingender (2014) and Shoah (2015) , the estimated multipliers are as high as 1.88 and 2.12. More recently, Kraay (2012 Kraay ( , 2014 use World Bank lending to lowincome countries as an instrument to arrive at the estimated fiscal multiplier of around 0.4 to 0.5.
Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013) find that the magnitude of the multipliers varies with a country's development, with the exchange rate regime and indebtedness.
On the theory side of demand, early sticky-price models emphasize the role of aggregate demand as a key driver of the business cycle (see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005; Galı, 2010; Woodford, 2003) . More recently, theoretical papers, motivated by the crisis, discuss the aggregate demand effects. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) build a simple new Keynesian model of debt-driven slumps, in which deleveraging agents depress aggregate demand. The paradox of thrift, a Keynesian-style multiplier and demand propagation emerge naturally from their model. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) model an economy's responses to an unexpected, permanent tightening of borrowing capacity. In that environment, constrained consumers are forced to repay their debt, and unconstrained consumers increase their precautionary savings.
This depresses the interest rate and causes output loss. Heathcote and Perri (2015) focus on selffulfilling unemployment. In their model, since households expect high employment, they have strong pre-cautionary incentives to cut spending, making the expectation of high employment a reality. 
IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
The identification strategy rests on the notion of exposure to tradable employment. To see the intuition, let's walk through a hypothetical example. Consider two counties A and B. Both have the population of 1000 people. Before the Great Recession, A is more exposed to RV manufacturing than B: A had 500 workers in the RV industry, while B had only 100 workers.
Suppose in the Recession, RV companies fired 50% of their workforces. County A now has 250 unemployed RV workers. Since county B is less exposed to RV manufacturing, it has only 50 unemployed workers. Even though the percentage declines of tradable employment within the RV industry are the same for the two counties, the size of tradable job losses (as a fraction of population) in county A is larger. As a consequence, the local service sector in A should be affected more. For that reason, I do not use percentage change of tradable employment as the main explanatory variable. Rather, I focus on the change of tradable employment relative to the population, and on the exposure to tradable employment.
Two related specifications are used. In the first specification, I exploit variation in the preexisting exposure to tradable employment across U.S. counties to proxy for the first round of job losses. The pre-existing exposure of a county is measured as the county's tradable employment divided by the county's population in 2007. Related to this, Mian and Sufi (2014) find that in counties with higher pre-crisis household leverage, non-tradable job losses during the crisis are larger. This is because deleveraging households cut consumption. While the cuts in tradable consumption affect jobs and firms elsewhere, the cuts in non-tradable consumption affect mostly the home county. My identification strategy is to show that counties with heavier exposure to tradable employment witness larger percentage declines in non-tradable employment, even after controlling for household's leverage. Moreover, it turns out that since household leverage and tradable exposure are correlated, we have to control for household leverage in all of our regressions.
In the second specification, I exploit the variation in the tradable job losses (normalized by population) across U.S. counties during the Great Recession. The argument is that since a county is small, tradable job losses are driven largely by external demand, and hence are exogenous to a restaurants and bars in a county. They account for a substantial fraction of employment. In 2007, they accounted for 19.6% of the nation's total employment. Their demand is generally income elastic (with many durable good retailers and restaurants), which makes them ideal candidates for spillover impacts. In section 7.1, I will further break them down to more income-elastic and less income-elastic industries.
The second source of data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS' Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages provide average weekly wages within a quarter for every NAICS 4-digit to 6-digit industry, across U.S. counties. For the analysis on non-tradable wage rigidity, I choose average weekly nominal wage for Full-Service Restaurants (NAICS code 7221). This is because the industry has the highest labor share among the non-tradable industries considered in this paper (see Table A .1), and hence arguably is the most representative. To be consistent with the timing of employment data, average weekly wages during quarter I, 2007 and during quarter I, 2010 are chosen.
5
County data at the four-digit industry level are sometimes suppressed for confidentiality reasons. However, the Census Bureau provides a range within which the employment number lies. As in Mian and Sufi (2014) , I take the mean of this range as a proxy for the missing employment number in such cases.
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The third major source of data is from the work of Atif Mian, Amir Sufi and other co-authors. 
MAIN RESULTS
In this section, I show that counties with higher tradable exposure in 2007 see steeper job losses in retail and restaurants. The relationship is robust to pre-crisis county characteristics such as percentage white, median household income, percentage owner-occupied, percentage with less than high school diploma, percentage with only a high school diploma, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and urbanization.
Tradable exposure and tradable job losses
Before proceed to the main results, it is useful to examine the relationship between tradable exposure and tradable job losses. Table 5 Table 1 Note: Only large counties with more than 20,000 households are included This is because tradable exposure and household leverage are negatively correlated, a point to which I will return at the end of the paper.
Baseline results
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in tradable job losses (relative to the population) causes a 0.98% increase in non-tradable job losses. 
With other control variables
From this section on, for brevity, I focus on tradable exposure as the main explanatory variable, although the results are also very strong and robust to the use of tradable job losses. Table 5.3 presents the results with other control variables. Note that compared to the sample used in Table   5 .2, I have removed 3 outliers in Table 5 .3. 
Robustness check 1
The result is robust to using an alternative measure for non-tradable job losses: the change in nontradable employment between 2007 and 2010, as a fraction of population in 2007. Table 5 .4 shows that tradable exposure still has a statistically significant and negative impact on non-tradable employment, with this alternative measure. Note that the setup is biased against obtaining a negative relationship, because the dependent and explanatory variables have the same denominator. 
Robustness check 2
The results are robust to using total employment in 2007, instead of population in 2007, to calculate tradable exposure. In Table 5 .4, a county's tradable exposure is defined as tradable employment in 2007 divided by the county's total employment in 2007. The results are as strong as in the benchmark case. However, conceptually, as discussed in section 3, using population is my preferred choice, because population arguably better captures a county's pre-crisis total purchasing power. Table 5 .5: Robustness check with a different measure of tradable exposure
In summary, section 5 shows a very strong and robust relationship between a county's tradable exposure and non-tradable employment losses during the Great Recession. The correlation is not driven by outliers or by particular specifications. In the next section, I will focus on examining competing hypotheses to the demand channel. 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES
First of all, it is not guaranteed that a drop in tradable employment will cause non-tradable employment losses. For example, Autor et al (2013) and Acemoglu et al (2015) find that import competition from China depresses manufacturing jobs in the U.S., but there is no spillover effect from manufacturing job losses to non-tradable job losses. Theoretically, if wages are flexible, a drop in tradable employment could even lead to a rise in non-tradable employment, because now there is an increase in labor supply.
However, there is little evidence for the downward adjustments of nominal wages in nontradable sectors. Nominal wages tend to be sticky, in the sense that they do not decline more in areas more exposed to tradable employment. Wages are measured as the average weekly wage during the first quarter of 2007, and that during the first quarter of 2010, for Full Service Restaurants sector (NAICS code 7221). Table 6 .0 shows the regression between the change in log wages and tradable exposure, with other control variables. Counties with higher pre-Recession tradable exposure do not seem to see stronger declines in wages. This indicates that cross-sectoral reallocation of labor, from tradable to non-tradable sectors, did not likely occur during the Great Recession. If there were hiring of unemployed tradable workers from restaurants, we would expect to see either hourly wages drop, or less hours worked per worker, both of which would result in lower average weekly wage. The wage stickiness result stands in contrast with what in Autor et al (2013) . They find that wages fall in areas more exposed to manufacturing industries facing competition from China. This is considered as evidence for a combination of negative demand and labor reallocation from manufacturing to non-manufacturing. One of the reasons for these different results is that the period Autor et al (2013) consider is longer (1990 to 2007), which allows for gradual wage adjustment. In contrast, the massive collapse of demand during the Great Recession took place in such a short time, preventing local wages to adjust.
Local nominal wage rigidity matters a great deal for demand driven propagation of job losses. If wages were flexible, we could still obtain full employment even with a negative demand shock, because wages would adjust to absorb additional labor. If local wages are sticky, the only way non-tradable firms adjust to the demand shock is to shed labor and scale down their businesses.
19 Table 6 .0: On nominal wage rigidity Even in the case that a drop in non-tradable employment accompanies a decline in tradable employment, it still does not mean the transmission operates through the demand channel. In the following sections, I examine in detail competing hypotheses: county specific supply shocks, exposure to construction, house prices and credit supply problems. I argue that none of the competing hypotheses square well with the data. 
County specific supply shocks
It is possible that an exogenous negative county-specific supply shock could hurt both tradable and non-tradable production, causing declines in employment of both sectors. If this were the case, the association between tradable and non-tradable job losses would be driven by a common third factor, invalidating the demand propagation channel. Among the factors, the most prominent one is a credit crunch. For example, if banks in a county reduce lending to both tradable and nontradable sectors, employment in both sectors would have to decline. More generally, any negative supply shocks could hurt both tradable and non-tradable employment in a similar manner.
Nevertheless, Mian and Sufi (2014) , and Δlog(NT Employment), which is more consistent with a demand story.
Construction
The collapse in the construction industry was very pronounced in the Great Recession.
Construction employment fell by 17.7% between 2007 and 2010 (Table 4 .1). It is possible that in counties with high tradable exposure, construction activities before the recession were also high, and the construction collapse during the Great Recession was larger. A concern is that the decline in construction employment, not the decline in tradable employment, caused the decline in nontradable employment.
21 Table 6 .2: Construction 
Housing
The house price collapse is one of the most dramatic characterizations of the Great Recession.
Using Zillow Research's house price index, I estimate that house prices on average fell 11.2%
between March 2007 and March 2010, across 945 counties where Zillow has data. With such a massive change, a reasonable concern is that housing could contaminate the proposed channel, in the following way: tradable job losses could depress house prices in a county, which then would reduce the net worth of locals. Bearing a negative wealth effect, they have to cut consumption, hurting the non-tradable sector. The spillover effect operates through the housing market. This is a closely related channel to the Keynesian demand propagation, but is not the same. Table 6 .3: Tradable exposure and house prices I do not see the housing channel in operation here. Table 6 .3 shows the impact of tradable exposure on house prices, with and without housing supply elasticity. Housing supply elasticity (Saiz, 2010) measures how abundantly land for development is available. It has been shown, by Mian and Sufi (2014) and others, to be powerful in explaining the run up in house prices before Great Recession, and the collapse of house prices during the Recession. There is no evidence that tradable exposure causes the decline in house prices between 2007 and 2010, after housing supply elasticity is included ( 
Credit
The most prominent competing hypothesis is credit-led spillovers. In other words, the spillovers from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector could take place via the credit market. For example, under-water tradable firms are late in their loan repayments, which weakens local banks' balance sheet. This in turn affects local lending to non-tradable firms. A decline in non-tradable employment therefore could be due to local credit problems, not local demand problems. Table 6 .4, however, shows this is not likely the case. Similar to the approach in Mian and Sufi (2014), I organize the regressions in two blocks. The first block, columns [1] to [6] , shows the change in log of the number of non-tradable establishments between 2007 and 2010, by size (1 to 4 workers, 5 to 9 workers, 10 to 19 workers etc). If credit channel were the problem, we should see that smaller non-tradable firms got hit more in counties more exposed to tradable employment, on the ground that smaller firms have more difficult access to credit. This is not the case here, as the coefficients become more negative for larger establishments. That is, higher tradable exposure hurts larger non-tradable firms more than it does smaller ones. The second block, columns [7] and [8] , splits the counties into two groups, one with more national banks (National=1), and one with more local banks (Local=1). If credit were to play a key role in the transmission, we would see that non-tradable job losses are more sensitive to tradable exposure in counties with more local banks, as local banks would be less likely to get help from outside their respective counties. I do not see that case in columns [7] and [8] . If anything, high tradable exposure reduces non-tradable employment more in counties with more national banks. 
EXTENSIONS
Three extensions to the benchmark results are provided. In the first extension, non-tradable sector is disaggregated to income-elastic and income-inelastic groups. In the second extension, a falsification test is conducted, in which tradable exposure of neighboring counties is used. In the third extension, I focus on exposure to the most vulnerable sectors. As it will be clear, the purpose of the extensions is to strengthen the argument for the demand-driven propagation of job losses.
Extension 1: Income-elastic v.s. income-inelastic non-tradable sectors
In this extension, non-tradable sectors are disaggregated into income-elastic and income-inelastic groups. If the impact of tradable exposure on job losses of income-elastic non-tradable sectors is larger than that of income-inelastic sectors, the finding would further support the demand-driven spillovers. This is because if non-demand factors were behind the spillovers, there is no reason to expect that the impacts on income-elastic sectors are larger. and personal care, gasoline stations and used merchandise stores are considered more necessary for our day to day living when our income declines. They belong to the income-inelastic group.
The remaining sectors belong to the income-elastic group. v.s. columns [3] and [4] ). This implies that the income-inelastic non-tradable sectors were less affected by the tradable job losses. The finding strengthens the argument for a demand-driven propagation from tradable job losses to non-tradable job losses.
The same story is observed for household leverage in 2006: income-elastic sector employment is more responsive to pre-crisis household leverage than income-inelastic sector employment is.
This confirms Amir and Sufi (2014)'s key result: deleveraging households cut consumption and caused unemployment.
Extension 2: A falsification test
In this section, a falsification test is conducted. For every county, I construct the average tradable exposure of other counties within the same state (referred to as neighboring counties). The average tradable exposure is calculated as the total tradable employment in these counties in 2007, divided by the total population of these counties in 2007. If the demand-driven propagation channel is in place, a county's non-tradable sector during the Great Recession should be little affected by the pre-existing tradable exposure of neighboring counties. Table 7 .2 shows this is the case. Tradable exposure of neighboring counties has some negative effects, but they are not significant at 5% level. When a county's tradable exposure is included (column [2] ), the impact of neighboring counties' tradable exposure disappears.
Extension 3: Tradable sectors with the most dramatic declines
In this extension, I focus on only tradable industries that had the most dramatic declines in employment during the Great Recession. Table A Table 7 .3 is more negative than that in column [2] .
Intuitively, this is because the hardest hit tradable industries suffered stronger job losses, which had more severe impacts on the local non-tradable sectors. 
CONCLUSION
The Great Recession was a very painful period in the world economic history. Behind the dry numbers are actual people and communities that suffer from job losses and the resulting hardship. It is important to understand, to the best as we can, the impacts of the Great Recession, among them, how shocks transmit across economic sectors and geographic areas.
This paper is among the effort to understand the Great Recession better. It provides empirical evidence for demand-driven propagation of job losses. It shows that in counties with heavier exposure to tradable employment, non-tradable employment losses during the Great Recession are higher. The result is statistically very significant and robust across different specifications and control variables, suggesting a powerful role of demand. The finding is not driven by the exposure to the construction sector, by the collapse in house prices, or by the credit shortage problem. Moreover, the propagation are stronger when I focus on the job losses of income-elastic non-tradable sectors, which provides further evidence for a demand story. Given the massive tradable employment losses, where some industries lost 30% to 40% of their workforce in such a short time span, it is not very surprising that counties could not absorb or respond to such massive shocks. The paper has strong policy implications. First of all, demand-driven mechanisms matter. This finding reinforces the important role of demand stabilizing policies to contain demand driven transmissions of negative shocks. Without such policies in place to assist hardest hit population and sectors, negative demand shocks can spread through other healthier sectors of the economy, and worsen the scale and scope of a recession. Clay product and refractory manufacturing -0.298
APPENDIX
Apparel knitting mills -0.288
Manufacturing and reproducing magnetic and optical media -0.252
Leather and hide tanning and finishing -0.240
Other textile product mills -0.225
Fabric mills -0.224
Hardware manufacturing -0.224
Oil and gas extraction -0.217
Audio and video equipment manufacturing -0.210
Other leather and allied product manufacturing -0.210
Household appliance manufacturing -0.208
Plastics product manufacturing -0.196
Other chemical product and preparation manufacturing -0.195
Fiber yarn and thread mills -0.194
Alumina and aluminum production and processing -0.190
Other miscellaneous manufacturing -0.188
Other nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing -0.188
Spring and wire product manufacturing -0.188
Textile furnishings mills -0.183
Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing -0.181
Textile and fabric finishing and fabric coating mills -0.179 -0.176 Office furniture (including fixtures) manufacturing -0.158
Foundries
Nonmetallic mineral mining and quarrying -0.152
Forest nurseries and gathering of forest products -0.147
Commercial and service industry machinery manufacturing -0.145
Cutlery and handtool manufacturing -0.133
Metalworking machinery manufacturing -0.128
Ventilation heating air-conditioning and commercial refrigeration -0.126
Industrial machinery manufacturing -0.125
Other chemical product and preparation manufacturing -0.120
Printing and related support activities -0.115
Sugar and confectionery product manufacturing -0.108
Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing -0.103
Nonferrous metal (except aluminum) production and processing -0.103
Tobacco manufacturing -0.103
Rubber product manufacturing -0.102
